Written by Yasir Abbas
Ask a compliance officer when their organization last screened staff against the OIG exclusion list and you will usually get a date, maybe even the name of the person who ran it. Ask when someone last read the EHR access logs (actually read them, or ran them through a tool that flags what matters) and the room tends to go quiet.
That quiet is the subject of this piece. Healthcare security monitoring sits in an odd place: everyone agrees it matters, the HIPAA Security Rule requires a version of it, and in a lot of hospitals and practices it is still nobody’s actual job.
HIPAA Asks For Two Things, And Most Teams Deliver One
The Security Rule splits logging into two duties that are easy to blur together. Section 164.312(b), the audit controls standard, requires mechanisms that record and examine activity in systems holding ePHI (Security Standards: Technical Safeguards, 2024). Most EHRs, firewalls and cloud platforms do the recording part out of the box, so teams meet this one almost by accident.
The second duty lives in the administrative safeguards at § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D), which calls for procedures to regularly review records of information system activity (Security Standards: Administrative Safeguards, 2024). That means audit logs, access reports and incident tracking reports, and it is a required specification with no addressable workaround.
Logs that nobody reviews meet the first rule and miss the second. If OCR ever opens an investigation, “the logs were there the whole time” is a strange thing to say out loud.
Ten Months Is The Number That Should Bother You
I find the time figures more worrying than the cost figures. Cost swings wildly with organization size, while time is the one thing a monitoring program directly controls.
In their 2026 Cost of a Data Breach study, IBM Security and Ponemon Institute (2026) put the average healthcare breach at $6.64 million, again the highest of any industry. Now look at the clock. Healthcare organizations needed an average of 220 days to identify a breach and 72 more to contain it, against 183 and 64 across all sectors. That adds up to roughly nine and a half months of an intruder having the run of the place, which is longer than some residency rotations.
The same study found that breaches contained within 200 days averaged $4.32 million, compared with $5.65 million for those that ran longer. Organizations that leaned heavily on security AI and automation cut 65 days from the lifecycle and about $1.93 million from the bill. Put those two findings side by side and the case for faster review mostly makes itself.
Nine Days At Change Healthcare
Most retellings of the February 2024 Change Healthcare attack stop at the front door. In testimony to Congress, UnitedHealth Group CEO Andrew Witty (2024) confirmed that attackers used stolen credentials on a Citrix remote access portal that lacked multifactor authentication.
The part I keep coming back to is what came after. By Witty’s account, the attackers moved laterally and pulled data out before deploying ransomware nine days later. That is nine days of activity inside a network that, like every large network, was writing logs the entire time. The final count reported to HHS reached about 192.7 million affected people, the largest healthcare breach on record in the United States (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights [HHS OCR], 2025a).
Would continuous monitoring have caught it? Nobody outside the forensic team can answer that with confidence, but nine days is a generous window.
Why The Monthly Log Review Falls Short
A mid-sized health system produces millions of log events a day across the EHR, the VPN, email, cloud apps, identity systems and a growing pile of connected devices. In many organizations, HIPAA audit log review means someone pulls an access report from one of those systems once a month, scans it for VIP lookups and signs off. It covers a sliver, weeks after the fact.
Correlation is the bigger gap. Forty failed logins on a single account mean little by themselves. A successful login from a new country means little by itself too, and so does a large export from the EHR, yet all three on one account inside an hour is an incident. Those events sit in separate systems, and nobody is lining them up at two in the morning.
That is the job security information and event management (SIEM) platforms exist to do. A SIEM collects logs from across the environment, normalizes them into one format and runs correlation rules so related events show up as one alert instead of scattered rows in different consoles. Compliance teams tend to overlook the side benefit: every alert, triage note and closure carries a timestamp, which is precisely the evidence of regular review the Security Rule asks for.
Deciding What Deserves An Alert
Tools don’t fix this on their own. An untuned SIEM can bury a team in alerts just as thoroughly as raw logs bury them in noise, so the real work is choosing what to watch.
In most healthcare environments I would start with remote logins that follow a burst of failures, chart access outside a user’s department or patient panel, newly created admin accounts and dormant accounts that suddenly wake up. Large exports or print jobs belong on the list, along with any system where someone switches logging off. That last one is a favorite move of competent attackers, and it costs almost nothing to alert on.
Every alert also needs a named owner and a written response. An alert that belongs to nobody is an unread log with a notification sound.
Compliance Has A Seat At This Table
Security engineers can write detection rules, but they often can’t tell which access patterns are inappropriate in a clinical setting. Privacy officers can. They know a registration clerk has no reason to open behavioral health notes, that a nurse checking a chart one unit over is usually fine, and that employee and celebrity records draw curious eyes.
So tuning works best as shared work, with security running the platform while compliance helps define “suspicious” and keeps the record of how the team handled each alert.
Why The Proposed Rule Should Not Delay Action
In January 2025, HHS proposed the first major rewrite of the Security Rule since 2013, with more specific audit trail and system log controls among the changes (HHS OCR, 2025b). HHS estimated first-year costs at about $9.3 billion, industry groups pushed back hard, and the rule was still unfinalized as of mid-2026.
Track it, by all means. Don’t wait for it, though, because the review requirement in § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) is already in force.
Where To Start If You Have Nothing Yet
Begin with an inventory of every system that touches ePHI and confirm logging is actually on, since “should be enabled” and “is enabled” turn out to be different findings surprisingly often. Next, get those logs into one place with retention an intruder can’t tamper with. Pick a handful of the alert scenarios above, give each an owner, and write a one-page procedure covering who reviews what and where the findings go. HIPAA’s six-year documentation retention applies to those records too.
Teams that want a structured framework can lean on NIST Special Publication 800-66 Revision 2, published jointly with OCR in 2024. It maps each Security Rule standard, audit controls included, to NIST Cybersecurity Framework subcategories and lists the NIST publications relevant to each one (Marron, 2024). For a compliance officer building a log review procedure from scratch, that mapping saves a lot of guesswork.
Then run a tabletop exercise built on a stolen credential scenario and time how long your team takes to notice. That number will tell you more than any policy binder.
References
IBM Security & Ponemon Institute. (2026). Cost of a data breach report 2026. IBM Corporation.
Marron, J. A. (2024). Implementing the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Security Rule: A cybersecurity resource guide (NIST Special Publication 800-66r2). National Institute of Standards and Technology.
Security Standards: Administrative Safeguards, 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) (2024).
Security Standards: Technical Safeguards, 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(b) (2024).
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights. (2025a). Change Healthcare cybersecurity incident frequently asked questions.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights. (2025b). HIPAA Security Rule to strengthen the cybersecurity of electronic protected health information. Federal Register, 90, 898.
Witty, A. (2024). Examining the Change Healthcare cyberattack [Testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives].
Author Biography
Yasir Abbas writes about artificial intelligence, cybersecurity and healthcare technology, with a focus on how emerging tools shape data protection and regulatory compliance. His work aims to turn technical security topics into practical guidance for healthcare professionals. Connect with Yasir on LinkedIn.
